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ON THE NECESSARY EXISTENCE OF 
AN OBJECT WITH CREATIVE POWER 
Charles J. Klein 
I present an argument which is related to the ontological argument which has 
a more plausible premise and a weaker conclusion. I assume two postulates 
concerning the meaning of 'x creates y'. I then prove that the proposition possi-
bly, something (non-vacuously) creates everything entails, in quantified 55, that 
there is a necessarily existing object with creative power - an object which cre-
ates all (and some) contingently existing objects in some possible world. 
Theism is often thought to embody the claim that: 
(A) There is a being that is causally responsible for the existence of 
everything. 
Like many traditional descriptions of God, A can be given interpretations 
according to which it is trivially false. In the following, I will give an inter-
pretation of A that is minimally generous and such that possibly A has intu-
itive appeaJ. I will then show informally that possibly A entails, in quanti-
fied 55, that there is a necessarily existing object that is possibly the creator 
of everything, although, so far as the derivation goes, he may actually be 
the creator of nothing. 
It will simplify what follows to employ the usual symbolism of quanti-
fied modal logic. I will use the following abbreviations: 
ENX iff df D3y(x=y)1 (x necessarily exists) 
Ecx iffdf 3y(x=y) 1\ - D3y(x=y) (x contingently exists) 
Also, we will say that x creates y just in case x is causally responsible for the 
existence of y. Now it is difficult to see how anything could be causally 
responsible for the existence of itself, or how anything could be causally 
responsible for the existence of a necessarily existing object. So I adopt the 
following postulates concerning the meaning of IX creates y': 
(PI) Necessarily, for all x, it is not the case that x creates x. 
(P2) Necessarily, for all x and for all y, if x creates y, then EcY. 
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With the intention to give a plausible interpretation of the thesis that some-
thing creates everything, we might take this to mean that something cre-
ates everything that contingently exists, since by P2, it is impossible that 
something create anything that necessarily exists. So: 
(B) Something creates every x such that Ecx. 
If, contrary to our suspicion, there are some necessarily existing objects but 
no contingently existing objects, then B will be true. Every necessarily exist-
ing object will be a vacuous creator. It will be causally responsible for the 
existence of all, that is, none, of the contingently existing objects. So let us 
consider a stronger hypothesis, that there is a non-vacuous creator: 
(C) Something creates every x such that Ecx, and there is an x such 
that Ecx. 
I recommend C as a minimally generous interpretation of A. More formal-
ly, C can be expressed as follows: 
(C I ) ::3 x[(z)(Ecz -+ x creates z) /\::3 y(EcY)] 
Let F be the property defined by: 
[(z)(Ecz -+ x creates z) /\ ::3y(EcY)] 
This could be read as the property of being an x such that x creates ali, and some, 
contingently existing objects. Let 0 be some object that satisfies Fx. Now sup-
pose that EcO. It then follows by C I that 0 creates 0, in violation of postu-
late PI" Relative to the class of objects that actually exist, the properties EC 
and E\I are contradictories. So since EcO is false, ENO is true - 0 necessarily 
exists. 
We have derived that anything that satisfies Fx also satisfies ENX. C1 
asserts that something satisfies Fx. So C I implies: 
Since we have assumed that it is necessarily true that nothing creates itself 
(PI) we can conclude that CI strictly implies C2• Simplifying CI to '3 xFx', we 
have: 
Now assume that it is possible that there be a non-vacuous creator. That is, 
assume OClt or: 
The following schema is universally valid in S5: 
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(5) (OP AD(P ---+ Q» --+ OQ 
Substituting '::3xFx' for 'P' and '::3x(ENx A Fx)' for 'Q', we can derive 0::3 x(ENx 
A Fx) from the resulting instance of 5, together with C3 and C4• So: 
If we eliminate the abbreviation 'EN' from Cs we get: 
In any model for quantified 55 in which C6 is true, there is some possible 
world w, accessible to the actual world, in which some object 0 satisfies 
the predicates ::3 y(x=y) and Fx. So 0 is F in wand something is identical 
to 0 in any world accessible to w. Given that accessibility is an equivalence 
relation in any 55 model, it follows that there is something identical to 0 in 
every world accessible to the actual world, and that 0 is F in some world 
accessible to the actual world. So C6 entails: 
(C7) ::3 x(D::3 y(y=x) A OFx) 
From the hypothesis that there could be something that non-vacuously cre-
ates every contingently existing thing, we have derived that there is a nec-
essarily existing object with creative power, though it is consistent with our 
premises that this object be perfectly idle in the actual world. 
There remains a sense, however, in which this argument constitutes of 
proof of the existence of God. Consider a theist who knows that following 
proposition is true: 
(C8) Necessarily, no necessary existent, other than God, can be 
causally responsible for the existence of something. 
I assume that it is an implicit tenet of Christian theology that there are no 
necessary beings with causal power, other than God. Given that the 
Christian can know that Cs is true, he may correctly speak of the object 
whose existence is established by the foregoing argument as God. 
Consequently, an atheist who accepts the conclusion of the argument may 
be said, in sense, to have come to believe in the existence of God: He 
believes that there exists a certain object of which it is true that x=God. In a 
more common sense, he does not believe in God. He does not believe that 
there is an x such that x=God. So it may seem that such conversion to the-
ism is trivial. An atheist who knows me well enough to believe anything I 
say with a certain seriousness might accept my assertion that: 
The object that I am currently contemplating, exists. 
If this object is God, then the atheist has come to believe that there exists a 
certain x which, unknown to him, is God. But the result of accepting the 
conclusion of the foregoing argument is more significant. Whereas the 
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property of being the object I am currently contemplating contingently applies 
to God, the property of being a necessary being with creative power2 is, in 
virtue of (CR), a logically individuating property of God. God necessarily 
possesses it, and nothing else could possibly possess it. The atheist who 
accepts C7 has the belief that there is an x which has a certain property, 
where this property is one which is necessarily coextensive with the one 
expressed by 'x is God'. To compel belief in God in this sense is perhaps 
the most that we can expect from considerations of logic and conceivability 
that are completely abstracted from matters of faith. 
University of Virginia 
NOTES 
1. The quantifiers here and throughout are 'actualist'. When sentences 
employing them are evaluated with respect to some world w, their range is all 
and only those individuals that exist in w. When there is no explicit relativiza-
tion to a possible world, their range is all and only those individuals that exist 
in the actual world. An individual constant denotes the same object irrespec-
tive of the world at which a sentence containing that constant is evaluated. I 
use lower case Roman letters for variables, and '0' as the only individual con-
stant. 
2. This is the property expressed by the predicate formed by dropping the 
initial quantifier from C7. 
